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AmCham EU has joined 16 industry partners in urging support for the amended Taxonomy Delegated Act. With application set for 1 January 2026, any delay would create legal uncertainty and disrupt company preparations already underway. The revised rules offer simplified and more consistent reporting obligations, essential for business confidence and regulatory stability. Reopening the process now would increase costs and undermine Europe’s competitiveness. Learn why timely adoption of the Delegated Act is critical to ensure predictable implementation, maintain trust in the EU Taxonomy framework and support companies’ sustainability efforts in the joint industry statement.

The Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR) is designed to support fair competition in the EU, but after two years of use it has become more complex and demanding than expected. Companies face heavy reporting requirements, unclear procedures and rising compliance costs, which risk slowing investment and creating uncertainty. To keep Europe competitive, the framework needs to be more focused, balanced and easier to apply. Clearer rules and a more proportionate approach would help ensure the system works as intended. Learn how these improvements can strengthen the FSR and support a more predictable business environment.

European policymakers are increasingly focused on strengthening the EU’s strategic autonomy, reducing strategic dependencies and building greater resilience across critical sectors. This drive is rooted in legitimate concerns about ensuring access to essential goods, increasing the diversity of supply chains and enhancing the EU’s ability to respond to geopolitical and economic challenges. As the EU seeks to address these challenges, its core objective should be to leverage its extensive partnerships and use smart incentives to support the bloc’s long-term competitiveness and security.

Lawmakers are actively considering ways that ‘Made in Europe’ criteria could support these objectives in virtually any process requiring clearance, approval or an auction. Global examples of domestic preference and non-price criteria demonstrate two things. First, if they are designed poorly, they could reduce competitiveness, simplification and resilience. However, they also demonstrate that if they are designed well, they can maximise the value of allies’ economic participation and improve the functioning of the processes they are applied to.

The US’s various ‘Buy America’ programmes provide a useful case study for assessing the risks of different ‘Made in Europe’ regimes. While US procurement and funding programmes with ‘Buy America’ provisions are generally open to foreign-headquartered participants (and actively encourage their participation), they also bring certain categories of risk that should be considered before bringing them to the EU.

If ‘Made in Europe’ effectively excludes firms headquartered in the US and other allied nations, including EU-based subsidiaries of US-headquartered firms, the EU risks introducing more complexity into European public procurement markets and funding programmes. This would ultimately diminish competition and the quality of products and services, while increasing costs and elevating trade tensions that may decreasing the market access of EU-headquartered companies abroad. At a time when the EU is facing urgent competitiveness challenges, policymakers should avoid pursing reactive security and resilience policies that would undermine the EU’s competitiveness goals.

However, if thoughtfully implemented, certain ‘Made in Europe’ regimes could leverage the EU’s Single Market and international partnerships to improve the EU’s competitiveness and resilience.